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RACE AND INTEREST CONVERGENCE  
IN NCAA SPORTS 
 
AMY CHRISTIAN MCCORMICK† 





ollege football and men’s basketball teams, once racially 
segregated, are now disproportionately populated by African 
Americans1 whose labor has helped make the college sports 
business stunningly lucrative.2 At the same time, National 
C
 †.  Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law; JD, Harvard Law 
School, 1991; BSBA, Georgetown University, 1988. 
 *.  Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law; JD, University of 
Michigan, 1973; BA, Michigan State University, 1969. 
 1.  See Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, Major College Sports: A 
Modern Apartheid, 12 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 13, 41, 43 (2010) (presenting findings 
showing that, during the 2009–2010 season, the starting lineups of the top twenty-five 
college football teams were, on average, 61 percent African American and that the rosters 
for the top twenty-five college basketball teams were, on average, 66 percent African 
American). 
 2.  See NCAA, 2009–10 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT 26 (2010), available at 
http://catalog.proemags.com/publication/0affe96d#/0affe96d/28 [hereinafter MEMBER-
SHIP REPORT] (showing that NCAA revenues for the reported period totaled 
$749,822,258, of which 86 percent were attributed to “television and marketing rights 
fees”); NCAA, FINANCIAL REVIEW OF 2010–11 POSTSEASON BOWLS: FIVE-YEAR SUMMARY OF 
GROSS RECEIPTS (2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/111c0f80472da438a 
309e7071e1ceb2b/5+yr+Summary+Gross+Receipts.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=111c
0f80472da438a309e7071e1ceb2b (showing that gross receipts from postseason bowls 
during the 2010–2011 season totaled $401,701,524). Much of this revenue is used to pay 
coaches, NCAA and conference officials, and university athletic directors. E.g., The 10 
Highest Paid Coaches in College Sports, U. REV. ONLINE (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.univ 
ersityreviewsonline.com/2011/02/the-10-highest-paid-coaches-in-college-sports.html 
(explaining that Bill Self of the University of Kansas, the lowest-paid of the top ten 
coaches discussed, received a salary of $3,675,656 in 2010 and that Nick Saban and Mike 
Krzyzewski were the highest-paid college football and basketball coaches for that year, 
earning over $6 million and $4 million, respectively). 
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Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) amateurism rules forbid 
these young men from receiving any compensation beyond the 
cost of attending college3 and reserve the vast financial rewards 
for the managers of college sports who are almost exclusively of 
European American descent.4 This regime, thus, adversely 
burdens African Americans who are required to relinquish the 
pecuniary fruits of their labor.5 
Of course, despite its many flaws, even this system is vastly 
superior to the prior regime under which African Americans were 
excluded altogether from participating in college sports.6 History 
demonstrates, however, that this advance emerged not always as a 
result of enlightened wisdom on the part of university 
administrators, but instead primarily out of their commercial 
interests.7 In that sense, the racial integration of college sports fits 
nicely within Professor Derrick Bell’s “interest-convergence” 
theory that the advancement of African Americans in society has 
been possible only when it converges with the interests of 
European Americans and not when it challenges the superior 
social status of the majority.8 Thus, while the inclusion of African 
Americans in college football and men’s basketball has enabled 
 3.  NCAA, 2011–12 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, arts. 15.1, 15.02.2 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D112.pdf [hereinafter DIV. I 
MANUAL]. Article 15.1 prohibits an athlete from receiving financial aid exceeding the cost 
of attendance. Id. Article 15.02.2 defines “cost of attendance” as including tuition and 
fees, room and board, books, supplies, transportation, and other education-related 
expenses. Id. 
 4.  See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 1, at 41, 43 (presenting findings 
showing that, during the 2009–2010 season, only a small percentage of athletic program 
administrators surveyed at top sports schools were African American). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See, e.g., LANE DEMAS, INTEGRATING THE GRIDIRON: BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
AMERICAN COLLEGE FOOTBALL 2 (2010) (“[B]lack athletes . . . endured more than one 
hundred years of struggle before they could fully participate in college [football,] . . . . 
[and] there were entire decades when [black] participation was zero . . . .”); Charles H. 
Martin, Jim Crow in the Gymnasium: The Integration of College Basketball in the American South, 
10 INT’L J. HIST. SPORT 68, 68 (1993) (noting the history of racial exclusion in college 
basketball). 
 7.  See infra Part III. A–E. 
 8.  See generally Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (arguing that the landmark 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education is attributable to “those whites in policymaking 
positions able to see the economic and political advances at home and abroad that would 
follow abandonment of segregation”). 
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college athletic teams to compete successfully9—and therefore to 
enjoy bountiful economic gain—longstanding NCAA amateurism 
rules simultaneously require those athletes to labor under a 
modern form of peonage where others harvest the fruits of their 
labor.10 Under such a system, the superior social and economic 
status of the European American managers of college sports 
remains intact. 
This Article will first reveal that the NCAA has campaigned 
for nearly sixty years to ensure that college athletes are 
characterized as students and not as employees as the law should 
require,11 and that its amateurism rules—which apply solely to 
athletes—guarantee that the athletes receive only a sliver of the 
economic value their labor helps produce.12 Part II will 
demonstrate that the players on elite football and men’s basketball 
teams are disproportionately of African American descent, while 
the managers and recipients of college sports revenue are nearly 
exclusively of European American extraction.13 Part III will trace 
the history of racial integration in college sports to demonstrate 
that it took place when it simultaneously served the economic 
interests of white-run bowl organizations and universities to field 
 9.  See, e.g., DEMAS, supra note 6, at 31 (describing the unexpected and inspiring 
success of the 1939 University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) Bruins, one of the first 
college football teams to include black athletes); see also Timothy Davis, The Myth of the 
Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 633 
(1995) (“During the post-World War II era, the African-American student-athlete 
emerged as a force to be reckoned with at predominately white colleges and 
universities.”). Of course, we do not assert that any one race has more genetic athletic 
talent or ability than another. See Harry Edwards, The Collegiate Athletic Arms Race: Origins 
and Implications of the “Rule 48” Controversy, 8 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 4, 9–10 (1984). 
Rather, the best athletic teams do not limit their rosters on the arbitrary basis of race, but 
draw from the broadest possible sources of talent. 
 10.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 12.1.2, 12.4.1.1 (rendering an athlete 
ineligible to compete if he uses his athletic skill directly or indirectly for pay and 
prohibiting him from receiving compensation on the basis of his “publicity, reputation, 
fame, or personal following”), 15.1, 15.02.2 (limiting an athlete’s financial aid to the cost 
of attending his university); Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The 
Emperor’s New Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495 
(2008) [hereinafter McCormick & McCormick, Emperor’s]; McCormick & McCormick, 
supra note 1; Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-
Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71 (2006) [hereinafter McCormick 
& McCormick, Myth]. 
 11.  See infra notes 16 through 32 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra notes 33 through 36 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See infra Part II. 
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the most competitive teams and thereby to enjoy the consequent 
financial reward.14 Drawing on the scholarship of Professor Bell, 
this Article concludes that the history of racial integration in 
college sports closely mirrors the interest convergence theory 
regarding the advancement of African Americans in society 
generally.15 
 
I. THE COLLEGE ATHLETE AS EMPLOYEE 
 
For the past decade, the NCAA has sponsored repeated 
advertisements during the annual men’s basketball tournament 
known as “March Madness.” Those vignettes depict young men 
and women metamorphosing from college athletes into airline 
pilots and other professionals and emphasize that most “student-
athletes” at NCAA institutions will be “going pro” in something 
other than sports.16 Why should the NCAA ceaselessly repeat to 
millions of viewers17 and devote such valuable airtime18 to 
promote the idea that college athletes are “student-at
In fact, the NCAA invented the term “student-athlete” in 
the 1950s in swift and alarmed response to a Colorado Supreme 
Court decision19 that an injured football player was, in fact, an 
employee of his institution and entitled to compensation for his 
 14.  See infra Part III. 
 15.  See infra notes 139 through 148 and accompanying text. 
 16.  E.g., NCAA, NCAA Public Service Announcement: Basketball, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 
2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G40g9RTxurw. 
 17.  Greg Johnson, Men’s Tournament Draws Highest Viewership in Six Years, NCAA 
LATEST NEWS (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/ 
Resources/Latest+News/2011/April/Mens+tournament+draws+highest+viewership+in+six
+years (“The 2011 NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Championship averaged 10.2 million 
viewers per game . . . .”). 
 18.  Indeed, although broadcasters pay enormous sums to the NCAA and 
conferences for the right to broadcast athletic events, they earn even larger amounts by 
selling advertising time during those events. In 2001–2002, for example, the college sports 
broadcasters American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”), Entertainment and Sports 
Programming Network (“ESPN”), National Broadcasting Company (“NBC”), and 
Columbia Broadcasting System (“CBS”) paid a total of $479 million for the right to 
broadcast all football and men’s basketball games. See Penelope Patsuris, A Wider World of 
TV Sports, FORBES.COM (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.forbes.com/2002/12/12/cx_pp_ 
1212sports.html. The advertising revenue, however, amounted to significantly more, or 
$616 million, demonstrating significant value of each minute of airtime. Id. Of course, ads 
aired during the popular March Madness tournament, during which the NCAA broadcasts 
its message, would use some of the most valuable of that airtime. Id. 
 19.  See Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1953) (en banc). 
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football injuries under state workers’ compensation laws.20 
Shocked by this development, the NCAA immediately coined the 
term “student-athlete” and required all NCAA members to use 
that term exclusively thereafter.21 By characterizing the athletes as 
“students,” the NCAA sought to thwart any tendency to identify 
them as employees. As then-NCAA Executive Director Walter 
Byers later wrote: 
 
[The] threat was the dreaded notion that NCAA 
athletes could be identified as employees by state 
industrial commissions and the courts. 
[To address that threat, w]e crafted the term 
student-athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA 
rules and interpretations as a mandated substitute for 
such words as players and athletes.22 
 
Through its advertising campaign and invented 
terminology, the NCAA has urgently sought to convince the public 
that college players are students, and, therefore, not employees. 
This year—2011—the NCAA’s commercials announce that sports 
“is not the goal” or “the finish line.”23 The implication is that 
something else, not sports, must be the goal. Like the earlier 
versions, these messages are designed to persuade the viewer that 
these young men and women are learning important “life lessons” 
from sports, and that they are students, not mere athletes. And if 
they are students, the thinking goes, they must not be employees. 
 20.  Id. at 430 (“In view of the facts herein recited and the weight of authority 
involving similar and related situations, it is apparent that there is sufficient relationship 
to the employment in the activity of Nemeth at the time of his injury to justify the 
conclusion that he is entitled to compensation.”). 
 21.  WALTER BYERS WITH CHARLES HAMMER, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: 
EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 69–76, 371–72 (1995); MURRAY SPERBER, ONWARD TO 
VICTORY: THE CRISES THAT SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS 445–46 (1998). 
 22.  BYERS & HAMMER, supra note 21, at 69 (emphasis in original). 
 23.  See NCAA Public Service Announcement (CBS television broadcast Mar. 2011), 
available at http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/Who+ 
We+Are/TV+Spots+landing+page/ (click “Watch the Endings PSA” hyperlink). The 2011 
version of this ad campaign visually integrates words into vignettes of athletic competition: 
“This is not the final buzzer; This is not the last inning; This is not the final goal; This is 
not a finish line.” The words “It’s a beginning” then appear during a graduation 
ceremony. Simultaneously, the narrator intones that nearly all of the more than 400,000 
NCAA student-athletes will be “going pro” in something other than sports. Id. 
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Contrary to this propaganda, however, athletes in revenue-
generating sports at NCAA institutions should, in fact, be viewed 
as “employees” under the law.24 They meet the common law 
standard for employee status25 as well as the statutory test for such 
status applicable to university students.26 As a result, these 
particular athletes should be able to enjoy the rights of employees, 
including the rights to bargain collectively,27 to be paid a market 
wage,28 and to receive protection under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964,29 the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970,30 the Fair Labor Standards Act,31 workers’ compensation 
acts,32 and other laws. 
NCAA amateurism rules, however, fail to treat college 
athletes as employees.33 Instead, they prevent these athletes from 
being paid even though their labor is an essential component of 
the lucrative product of college sports.34 Amateurism rules are 
imposed only on athletes, not on coaches, athletic directors, 
university officials, NCAA or conference officials, or anyone else in 
the college sports world.35 As we will show below, by applying only 
to athletes, NCAA amateurism rules operate to burden African 
Americans disproportionately and to benefit European Americans 
by reserving the revenue generated by these young men only for 
the managers of college sports.36 
 24.  McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 10; see also DEMAS, supra note 6, at 
134–35 (describing the transformation of amateur college athletics into a professional and 
“lucrative business venture” and the athletes’ abilities and roles as being consistent with 
working effectively in the business world). 
 25.  McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 10, at 97–119. 
 26.  Id. at 119–53. 
 27.  Id. at 80–81. 
 28.  Id. at 80. 
 29.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (2006). 
 30.  29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. (2006). 
 31.  29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 32.  McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 10, at 83 n.41. 
 33.  McCormick & McCormick, Emperor’s, supra note 10, at 507–08. 
 34.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 12.1.2, 12.4.1.1, 15.1, 15.02.2; McCormick 
& McCormick, Emperor’s, supra note 10, 505–44; McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra 
note 10, at 74 n.11, 131–35 (describing how NCAA rules prevent college athletes from 
being paid); see supra notes 2, 18, and accompanying text (describing economic impact of 
college sports). 
 35.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, art. 12.01.1 (requiring amateur status only for 
“student-athlete[s]”); McCormick & McCormick, supra note 1, at 24. 
 36.  McCormick & McCormick, supra note 1, at 45. 
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II. ADVERSE RACIAL IMPACT OF NCAA AMATEURISM REGIME 
 
  An examination of the racial composition of players on the 
top-ranked football and men’s basketball teams reveals, not 
surprisingly, that the overall pattern among these elite teams—the 
teams that generate the bulk of college sports revenue37—is that 
players tend to be African American in very large numbers38 while 
the primary officials at those same schools are almost entirely of 
European American descent.39 Indeed, among the top twenty-five 
college football teams in January 2010, 61 percent of the players 
were African American while 96 percent of the administrators 
were European American.40 Among the top twenty-five men’s 
basketball teams, some 66 percent of players were African 
American, while 92 percent of administrators were European 
American.41 At the same time, only 5 percent of the 
undergraduate students at the football schools were African 
American, while just 7 percent of the undergraduates at the 
basketball schools were African American.42 
 37.  Universities are rewarded financially for athletic success. For example, football 
teams earn revenue for their conferences by winning, or even attending, a BCS Bowl 
Game. See Bowl Championship Series, The BCS is . . . , BOWL CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES (July 
22, 2011, 1:09 PM), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809716 (noting that a 
conference with one team qualifying for a BCS bowl receives approximately $22 million in 
net revenue and another $6 million if a second conference member qualifies). Moreover, 
men’s basketball teams earn payments for their conferences for each game they play in 
the March Madness tournament. See MEMBERSHIP REPORT, supra note 2, at 29. In 2010–
2011, the NCAA paid conferences some $239,664 for each game a conference member 
won during the March 2011 NCAA men’s basketball tournament. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE 
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2010–2011 REVENUE DISTRIBUTION PLAN 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/46f776004e0d547d9ef9fe1ad6fc8b25/2010-
11+Revenue+Distribution+Plan+%28Current%29+%28Revisions%29.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
&CACHEID=46f776004e0d547d9ef9fe1ad6fc8b25. Conferences then distribute their 
revenues, in large part, to their member universities. See, e.g., Big Twelve Conference, Inc., 
I.R.S. Form 990, EIN 75-2604555, FYE June 30, 2008, available at http://www.guidestar. 
org/FinDocuments/2008/752/604/2008-752604555-04c467d6-9.pdf. The more athletic 
success a team enjoys, the more revenue is generated for its conference, and thus, for the 
conference members. 
 38.  See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 1, at 34. 
 39.  Id. at 33. 
 40.  Id. at 41. 
 41.  Id. at 43. 
 42.  Id. at 41, 43; see also DEMAS, supra note 6, at 138–39 (criticizing the low rates of 
African American students at U.S. universities in contrast to the higher rates of African 
American students on those institutions’ football and men’s basketball teams). 
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Moreover, a survey of the most highly ranked and recruited 
high school seniors in January 2010—the vast majority of whom 
now play football or men’s basketball at NCAA institutions—shows 
that the overwhelming majority were African American.43 Indeed, 
82 percent of the top two hundred and fifty high school senior 
football players in America were African American, while more 
than 88 percent of the top one hundred and fifty high school 
basketball players were African American.44 
By contrast, that same year some 92.5 percent of university 
presidents at Football Bowl Subdivision schools were European 
American,45 while only 4 percent were African American.46 As for 
athletic directors at Division I schools, some 88.8 percent were 
European American, while only 7.4 percent were African 
American.47 And while 21 percent of men’s Division I basketball 
coaches were African American,48 only 11 percent of head coaches 
in football—where most of the money in college sports is 
generated—were African American.49 
This evidence shows that the players—a largely African 
American work force—are generating tremendous wealth by 
creating the product of college sports, but are forbidden from 
sharing in that wealth. On the contrary, NCAA amateurism rules 
guarantee that the money generated in substantial part by the 
athletes’ arduous and often dangerous work will be reserved to 
benefit the overwhelmingly European American managers of the 
college sports industry.50 In this way, the NCAA amateurism 
regime—in which free market principles determine compensation 
for coaches and all other economic beneficiaries of college sports, 
 43.  McCormick & McCormick, supra note 1, at 43–44. 
 44.  Id. at 44; Edwards, supra note 9, at 10 (positing that athletics attracts a 
disproportionate number of young African American men for the dual reasons that 
African Americans see successful models mainly in that field, not in others such as 
science, medicine, or law, while young white men, by contrast, “are exposed to countless 
role models and occupational opportunities” and, therefore, do not necessarily pursue 
athletics as a career). 
 45.  Richard Lapchick, The 2010 Racial and Gender Report Card: College Sport 3 (March 
3, 2011), http://www.bus.ucf.edu/documents/sport/2010-college-rgrc.pdf. 
 46.  Id. at 10. 
 47.  Id. at 19, 21. 
 48.  Id. at 1. 
 49.  Id. at 15. 
 50.  See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 1, at 14; DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, 
arts. 12.1.2, 12.4.1.1, 15.1, and 15.02.2. 
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but not for athletes—replicates apartheid-like systems that have 
existed throughout history and under which members of the racial 
majority have exploited the labor of minorities for entertainment 
and profit.51 
 
III. INTEREST CONVERGENCE AND INTEGRATION OF COLLEGE 
ATHLETICS 
 
  It is plainly true that college teams have high percentages of 
African American players as a result of the integration of college 
sports which had previously been entirely, or almost entirely, 
white.52 And integration, of course, was a monumental step 
forward from the previous exclusionary regime. The racial 
integration of college sports meant that college educations 
became available to many young black men who might never have 
otherwise attended college.53 Furthermore, young white men and 
 51.  McCormick & McCormick, supra note 1, at 23–26 (describing parallels between 
particular provisions of South African economic and labor legislation under Apartheid 
and NCAA amateurism rules); see also Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, 
Letter to the Editor, ‘Amateurism’ Rules Benefit Whites at Blacks’ Expense, CHRON. HIGHER 
EDUC. (May 20, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/Amateurism-Rules-Benefit/127544/. 
 52.  See supra note 6 (describing prior segregation in college sports); McCormick & 
McCormick, supra note 1, at 14 (describing how players on contemporary college teams 
are mostly made up of African Americans). 
 53.  See, e.g., DEMAS, supra note 6, at 109–10 (noting that in 1968 “recruitment of 
minority athletes helped African Americans obtain what little access universities granted 
them in the wake of the 1964 Civil Rights Act”); id. at 118 (stating that “America was . . . 
convinced of the benefits and opportunities athletics offered young black men[,]” 
including “riches, fame, and a free education”); id. at 120 (describing Americans’ views 
that athletics gave African American athletes “a special opportunity” and “an immense 
favor” by allowing them the “chance to really do something for their people by getting 
that education”); id. at 135 (describing widespread American view that sports provided 
African American college athletes with an education); BILL ELDER, ALL GUTS AND NO 
GLORY: AN ALABAMA COACH’S MEMOIR OF DESEGREGATING COLLEGE ATHLETICS 128 
(NewSouth Books 2007) (noting that integrating his junior college basketball team 
“provide[d] an opportunity for black athletes to get a college education”); KENNETH L. 
SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA 103 (1996) (noting “the 
concept of the student-athlete experience as a route of academic opportunity for African-
Americans”); id. at 106 (describing educational opportunities some African American 
athletes have obtained through their athletic scholarships); Dana D. Brooks & Ronald 
Althouse, The Legacy of Brown: Commodification of the African American Student-Athlete?, in 
REVERSING FIELD: EXAMINING COMMERCIALIZATION, LABOR, GENDER, AND RACE IN 21ST-
CENTURY SPORTS LAW 301, 308 (André Douglas Pond Cummings & Anne Marie Lofaso 
eds., 2010) [hereinafter REVERSING FIELD] (asserting that “sports . . . provide a vehicle 
through which African American athletes gain access to higher education”); Leonard J. 
Elmore, The Continuing Dilemma, in REVERSING FIELD, supra, at 284 (asserting that “[s]ports 
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women were exposed to more black people in the educational 
setting.54 
At the same time, however, the quality of the education 
that many athletes receive is questionable for a variety of reasons,55 
can . . . create and generate educational and financial opportunities for many individuals 
of every hue who are . . . shut out of the mainstream of opportunity”). 
 54.  Cf. Bell, supra note 8, at 533 (noting the value many white parents see in 
integrating their children’s schools); Robert A. Garda, The White Interest in School 
Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV. 599, 600–03 (2011) (describing the social and academic 
benefits white children receive from attending integrated schools). 
 55.  See, e.g., SHROPSHIRE, supra note 53, at 106 (noting the friction between athletic 
success and academic study in college); Brooks & Althouse, supra note 53, at 307 
(asserting that “[c]ollege campuses and junior college campuses are scandalized by the 
ways in which courses are selected, grades changed, and eligibility extended for African 
American athletes”); Elmore, supra note 53, at 290 (describing a variety of obstacles 
barring access to true education for college athletes, including under-preparation in high 
school, valuing athletic ability over academic ability in recruiting decisions, “patronizing 
attitudes,” “dummy courses,” and exceptional pressures facing the student-athlete); 
McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 10, at 135–55; Norman R. Yetman & Forrest J. 
Berghorn, Racial Participation and Integration in Intercollegiate Basketball: A Longitudinal 
Perspective, 10 SOC. SPORT J. 301, 311 (1993) (revealing continued negative educational 
outcomes for African American college basketball athletes); E-mail from Frank G. Splitt, 
former McCormick Faculty Fellow, Northwestern University, to Thomas G. Palaima, 
Raymond F. Dickson Centennial Professor of Classics, University of Texas at Austin (May 
18, 2011) (on file with author) (stating that “athletes are kept eligible to play via 
participation in clustered classes and diploma-mill like programs engineered at jocks-only 
academic resource centers—notwithstanding very limited time to study because of . . . 
intense time demands of their sport . . . [and] these athletes are exposed to brain trauma” 
and noting that “[s]imply put, these athletes really have little chance of getting a 
meaningful college education”). 
  In fact, many college athletes fail altogether to graduate, and the graduation 
rates for African American athletes have remained particularly troubling. Richard E. 
Lapchick, Keeping Score When It Counts: Assessing the 2010–11 Bowl-Bound College Football 
Teams–Academic Performance Improves But Race Still Matters, available at http://www.tide 
sport.org/Grad%20Rates/2010-11_APR-GSR_BowlStudy.pdf (last visited on July 12, 
2011); Richard E. Lapchick, Keeping Score When It Counts: Graduation Success and Academic 
Progress Rates for the 2011 NCAA Division I Men’s Basketball Tournament Teams, available at 
http://www.tidesport.org/Grad%20Rates/2011_Mens_Bball_FINAL.pdf (last visited on 
July 12, 2011); see also SHROPSHIRE, supra note 53, at 126 (discussing low graduation rates 
for African American athletes); Brooks & Althouse, supra note 53, at 304 (discussing low 
graduation rates for African American athletes); Elmore, supra note 53, at 289 (discussing 
low graduation rates for African American athletes); cf. Edwards, supra note 9, at 7 (noting 
that the promise of an education in exchange for athletic services “turns out to be far less 
than an iron-clad guarantee” because the athletic scholarship is “technically given [only] 
one year at a time under existing NCAA rules”); id. at 7–8 (describing various factors that 
contribute to low graduation rates for African American college athletes, including the 
fact that most non-athlete students need more than four years to complete degree 
requirements, widespread poor academic preparation before college, the time 
commitment required for athletic activities, and the exhaustion they experience from 
their sports); Pat Eaton-Robb, Jackson: Ohio State Forced Transfer: Ex-Grand Ledge Football Star 
Says He Didn’t Know Scholarship Was Year to Year, LANSING ST. J., June 26, 2011, at 1D 
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and black athletes’ presence on campus for their athletic ability, 
not their intellectual promise, stereotypes them as “jocks,” not 
learners,56 thereby nurturing unconscious racism in society 
generally. These stereotypes are harmful in many ways,57 not the 
least of which is that they may serve to dissuade many young black 
Americans from pursuing careers in science, medicine, law, and 
other professions and induce them instead to pursue the virtually 
impossible dream of a career in professional sports.58 
Regardless, the integration of college sports, as well as the 
availability of athletic scholarships for young African Americans, 
emerged, in our view, not from the enlightened beneficence of 
U.S. universities and their leaders, desirous of improving the lot of 
(describing NCAA rules limiting athletic scholarships to a period of one year and, 
therefore, preventing many financially constrained African American athletes from 
finishing their degrees if the coach declines to renew their scholarships). 
 56.  Davis, supra note 9, at 674 (describing this phenomenon); Elmore, supra note 
53, at 289 (describing the presence of athletes who lack academic success as generating 
stereotypes with negative racial overtones); see also DEMAS, supra note 6, at 138–39 
(describing the problems of low African American enrollment at universities as a whole 
and the “We Shall Not Be the Only Ones” campaign that protested the discrepancy 
between the presence of African Americans in college sports and their relative absence in 
the overall student body); Brooks & Althouse, supra note 53, at 307 (suggesting that 
stereotypes about African American athletes also affect African Americans who are not 
athletes). 
 57.  See generally Davis, supra note 9, at 643–78 (providing an in-depth analysis of 
racial stereotypes in sports and the harms they pose); see also DEMAS, supra note 6, at 137 
(describing the view of some black athletes that “America’s infatuation with sport 
hindered blacks in higher education by limiting their options, perpetuating 
misunderstanding, stereotyping black masculinity, and reinforcing white domination in 
the form of all-powerful coaches and administrators”); Brooks & Althouse, supra note 53, 
at 304 (describing negative effects of stereotypes of African American athletes); Todd J. 
Clark, Professional Equality: The Rooney Rule, Introduction, in REVERSING FIELD, supra note 53, 
at 350 (describing the tendency for African Americans to be described as successful only 
when they have athletic ability, and not because of their decision-making or leadership 
skills); Elmore, supra note 53, at 288 (describing stereotypes even distinguished academics 
accorded to athletes as including the words “‘dumb,’ ‘violent,’ ‘rapist,’ and ‘drug user’”). 
 58.  Brooks & Althouse, supra note 53, at 304; Edwards, supra note 9, at 9–11, 13 
(describing sociological factors that encourage African Americans towards athletic as 
opposed to other forms of achievement and describing how few sports-related jobs exist in 
the United States). Even NCAA-published figures indicate that less than 2 percent of 
NCAA college athletes will become professional athletes, demonstrating that a career in 
professional sports is a virtually impossible dream. NCAA, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF 
COMPETING IN ATHLETICS BEYOND THE HIGH SCHOOL INTERSCHOLASTIC LEVEL, available 
at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/issues/recruiting/probability 
+of+going+pro (last visited July 6, 2011) (noting that only 1.2 percent of NCAA men’s 
basketball players and only 1.7 percent of NCAA football players will become professional 
athletes). 
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African Americans, but instead from the economic interests of 
those same, predominantly European American leaders.59 
In his landmark 1980 Harvard Law Review article, Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, Professor 
Derrick Bell introduced the interest-convergence theory in legal 
scholarship.60 This principle provides that “[t]he interest of blacks 
 59.  See, e.g., ELDER, supra note 53, at 13 (“[T]he people who made the decisions that 
brought black players into the mainstream of athletics did not have altruistic motives. The 
thing uppermost in the[ir] minds . . . was winning, not bringing about social change.”); 
Davis, supra note 9, at 622 (positing that “economic considerations were one of the 
significant influences leading to the eventual end of segregation in college sport”); id. at 
635–36 (applying interest convergence analysis to college sports by describing how African 
American athletes have been incorporated into the revenue-generating sports, but not 
into the non-revenue sports, and suggesting that colleges were willing to “set aside 
discriminatory practices” only when financial rewards could be reaped); Ronald E. 
Marcello, The Integration of Intercollegiate Athletics in Texas: North Texas State College as a Test 
Case, 1956, 14 J. SPORT HIST. 286, 299–300 (1987) (“It would be a mistake . . . to view these 
coaches as crusaders in the . . . civil rights movement. Rather they . . . understood that . . . 
there was a vast reservoir of black football talent in Texas that would make them winners 
for years to come.”); id. at 300 (“[T]he coaches readily understood that black athletes 
were potential contributors to the team’s success”); id. at 309 (describing change in 
attitudes of white players because they understood that the presence of African American 
players “represented a potential contribution towards victories” which would “benefit[] 
everyone, black and white”); id. (describing coaches’ realization that “winning seasons 
enhanced” their own “prestige and gained additional revenues for the football program” 
and that “[i]t was to their benefit, therefore, to play the best athletes . . . regardless of skin 
color”); id. at 310 (describing fans’ acceptance and enthusiasm for North Texas State 
College’s first African American player because his ability meant they were winning: 
“[w]hatever their racial prejudices, most North Texas fans were colorblind when it came 
to supporting a winner”); id. at 316 (stating that “since winning benefitted everyone, 
toleration became profitable for everyone, black and white”); John Whittaker, An Open 
Letter to K.L. (Tug) Wilson, Commissioner, Big Ten Conference, HAMMOND TIMES, Mar. 24, 
1947, reprinted in TOM GRAHAM & RACHEL GRAHAM CODY, GETTING OPEN: THE UNKNOWN 
STORY OF BILL GARRETT AND THE INTEGRATION OF COLLEGE BASKETBALL 87 (Atria Books 
2006) (advocating integration of Big Ten basketball teams and pointing out that such 
integration in Big Ten football had drawn $200,000 crowds); see also Charles H. Martin, 
Hold That (Color) Line! Black Exclusion and Southeastern Conference Football, in HIGHER 
EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: WHITE SUPREMACY, BLACK SOUTHERNERS, 
AND COLLEGE CAMPUSES 167, 168 (Peter Wallenstein ed., 2008) (describing the southern 
desire to maintain white supremacy as being in conflict with the desire to win football 
games). These attitudes illustrate that it was not racial enlightenment, but rather self-
interest, that spurred the integration of college sports. Although North Texas State 
College welcomed African American players in 1956 for the chance to win more football 
games, integration was limited to the field. “Three years passed . . . before . . . [the new 
African American star athlete could] reside on campus and eat in the dormitories 
[because those venues remained segregated]. The black athletes were an equal part of the 
team but not an equal part of the college.” Marcello, supra, at 316; see also id. at 295–96, 
311. The lack of full integration in dining and living facilities demonstrated that it was 
white self-interest, not altruism, prompting the admission of black athletes. 
 60.  Bell, supra note 8. 
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in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it 
converges with the interests of whites . . . . [And it will not be 
accommodated] where the remedy sought threatens the superior 
societal status of middle and upper class whites.”61 Professor Bell 
argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education62 was possible, for example, only because it served to 
advance the interests of the majority race.63 The remainder of this 
Article will trace significant historical highlights of college sports 
integration and discuss the applicability of Bell’s interest-
convergence theory in that context. 
 
A. Southern Segregation Requirements 
 
Like southern universities, southern college football and 
basketball teams were strictly segregated on the basis of race from 
their inceptions.64 Southern schools did not accept African 
Americans as students and, therefore, had no African American 
athletes on their teams.65 As intersectional games became more 
frequent because of the growing popularity of these sports, the 
possibility arose that a southern team would be matched against a 
northern team with one or more African American players.66 
According to southern sensibilities, such mixed-race competitions 
would suggest equality between races and, therefore, could not be 
permitted.67 Thus, as a condition of competing, southern schools 
 61.  Id. at 523. 
 62.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 63.  Bell, supra note 8, at 523–26. 
 64.  See DEMAS, supra note 6, at 2–3, 8 (discussing segregation in football); Martin, 
supra note 6, at 68 (discussing segregation in basketball). 
 65.  See, e.g., DEMAS, supra note 6, at 8; Davis, supra note 9, at 624. Because this 
Article addresses integration, we do not discuss the cadre of historically black colleges and 
universities, and our statements about southern schools are not intended to apply to 
them. 
 66.  See Charles H. Martin, Integrating New Year’s Day: The Racial Politics of College Bowl 
Games in the American South, 24 J. SPORT HIST. 358, 361 (1997) (observing that because 
“the new events were located in the Lower South[,] . . . possible conflicts [could arise] for 
those northern schools whose rosters included . . . [any] black athletes”). 
 67.  Id. at 373 (“To grant equality on the playing field, even if only for three hours, 
represented an unacceptable symbolic action because it suggested the possibility of 
equality in other areas of southern life.”); see Davis, supra note 9, at 626 (describing 
interracial competitions as “out of the question”); Martin, supra note 6, at 75. 
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demanded that northern schools exclude any African American 
players from participating in the contests.68 
 
B. Northern Acquiescence in Southern Segregation During  
the 1930s and Early 1940s 
 
By the 1930s, regular-season intersectional games and bowl 
competitions were growing more popular and, therefore, 
beginning to proliferate and generate substantial revenue.69 By 
the end of that decade, the Orange Bowl, Cotton Bowl, and Sugar 
Bowl, located in Miami, Dallas, and New Orleans, respectively, 
were becoming prestigious and lucrative, both for their organizers 
and for the universities that participated.70 And because these 
games were played in the South, African American athletes were 
prohibited from playing.71 To reap the revenue from regular-
season intersectional games as well as the acclaim and increasing 
financial rewards of post-season bowl competition, northern teams 
universally acquiesced in, and therefore enabled, southern 
demands for racial exclusion during this period.72 
For example, in 1940, Boston College agreed to bench its 
African American player, Lou Montgomery, in order to accept an 
invitation to compete against Clemson University in the Cotton 
Bowl.73 The following year, Boston College again excluded 
Montgomery so it could play in the Sugar Bowl.74 These events 
 68.  E.g., Davis, supra note 9, at 627–28; Martin, supra note 66, at 360; Martin, supra 
note 6, at 74, 76 (providing numerous examples of southern schools refusing to 
participate in interracial competitions). 
 69.  DEMAS, supra note 6, at 32 (stating that “intersectional sporting contests became 
an important means by which schools and teams earned rankings, reputations, and 
popularity” and noting that “[e]ven before the age of television, by 1939 an invitation to 
play in any of the five bowls guaranteed the institutions significant income, press 
coverage, and prestige”); id. at 77. Indeed, the “generous payouts . . . that bowl games 
provided,” Martin, supra note 66, at 360, prompted one newspaper in 1939 to call them 
“$100,000 gravy-bowl games.” DEMAS, supra note 6, at 38. 
 70.  See Martin, supra note 66, at 359–61. 
 71.  See id. at 359–60 (noting that the South’s “strategic grip on January 1 thus 
enabled whites in Dixie to impose their racial values on nonsouthern teams, in effect, 
‘southernizing’ the national sport”). 
 72.  See id. at 359–61. 
 73.  Id. at 362. Boston College had already excluded Montgomery from two home 
games against Auburn University and the University of Florida during the 1939 regular 
season. Id. 
 74.  Id. 
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revealed “the willingness of ambitious northern universities to 
abandon their black players in pursuit of athletic success and 
financial rewards.”75 In that manner, when the economic interests 
of northern schools conflicted with the interests of African 
Americans, the economic interests prevailed. Put differently, when 
the interests of African American students failed to converge with 
those of white university officials, the northern colleges 
abandoned the former for the latter. Because African American 
interests in equal treatment did not converge with those of white 
university officials, African American interests were sacrificed.76 
 
C. World War II and the Post-War Period—Beginnings of  
Northern Transition 
 
During World War II, the available pool of white college-
aged men declined sharply.77 To avoid cancelling their athletic 
seasons and foregoing revenue and other benefits, northern 
colleges filled their rosters by enrolling more African American 
athletes.78 Again, when the northern universities’ economic 
interests converged with the interests of African Americans, racial 
progress could take place.79 
After World War II, northern schools, which had 
increasingly desegregated during the war, began objecting to 
 75.  Id.; see also id. at 359–60 (“This capitulation by northern coaches and 
administrators . . . reflected their tolerance for racial discrimination, the small number of 
black players on their squads, . . . and the growing lure of generous payouts and national 
prestige that bowl games provided.”). 
 76.  Cf. Bell, supra note 8, at 522–26 (describing interest convergence in the context 
of educational integration). 
 77.  See Davis, supra note 9, at 633–34. 
 78.  Id. (noting that American involvement in World War II created a shortage of 
white college-aged athletes and thereby suggesting that commercial interests, therefore, 
led northern universities to fill team rosters by resorting to African American athletes 
rather than to cancel their seasons); Harry Edwards, Playoffs and Payoffs: The African-
American Athlete as an Institutional Resource, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 91 (Billy J. 
Tidwell ed., 1994) (describing the shortage of white players during World War II and the 
resulting opportunities for African American players in college); Donald Spivey, The Black 
Athlete in Big-Time Intercollegiate Sports, 1941–1968, 44 PHYLON: ATLANTA U. REV. RACE & 
CULTURE 116, 121 (1983) (identifying the vacuum of white manpower in college sports 
caused by World War II as a primary reason why universities utilized black athletes during 
that period). 
 79.  Cf. Bell, supra note 8 (describing interest convergence in the context of 
educational integration). 
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southern segregation rules.80 Their few African American players 
tended to be among their most talented81 and, seeking to preserve 
this advantage, northern schools began to resist, and some refused 
outright, the demands of southern schools that African American 
players not compete.82 As a result, several games were cancelled 
and some intersectional rivalries were terminated when northern 
teams insisted on reserving the right of African Americans to 
participate.83 For example, in November 1946, Penn State 
University (“Penn State”) refused to leave its two African American 
players out of a scheduled game with the University of Miami, and 
the game was cancelled.84 Penn State subsequently issued the 
following formal statement: “It is the policy of the college to 
compete only under circumstances which will permit the playing 
of any or all members of its athletic teams.”85 
While some northern universities were plainly motivated by 
egalitarian principles,86 to the extent they were prompted by the 
desire to keep growing numbers of talented African American 
athletes available for competition against southern rivals, their 
economic interests converged with black players’ interests 
 80.  During this period, many northern schools stopped benching African American 
players for intersectional games they played in northern venues, and some even 
challenged the “policy of racial exclusion for games played in Dixie.” Martin, supra note 
66, at 362. 
 81.  Davis, supra note 9, at 629–30. 
 82.  Martin, supra note 66, at 362. 
 83.  Id. Economic advantage, apparently, was not the sole motive behind the greater 
integration of northern teams and their objection to southern exclusionary rules. “As a 
result of the wartime campaign against Nazi doctrines of Aryan supremacy, liberal 
attitudes favoring equal opportunity in sports became commonplace on northern 
campuses.” Id. 
 84.  Id. at 363, 368. 
 85.  Id. at 363. 
 86.  As early as 1940, Penn State had refused to comply with the U.S. Naval 
Academy’s insistence that black sprinter, Barney Ewell, be benched in an Annapolis track 
meet and instead forced the meet to be moved to State College where Ewell could 
compete. Id. Then, in 1947, Penn State “declined an invitation to send . . . [its] boxing 
team to the . . . Sugar Bowl boxing tournament, from which African American boxers 
were excluded. The action was based entirely on principle, since there were no black 
boxers on the current team.” Id. 
  Some other schools followed suit. In January 1947, “Duquesne University 
canceled an outdoor basketball game” at the University of Miami, and “[s]everal other 
intersectional football and basketball games were canceled . . . in the late 1940s and early 
1950s for similar reasons.” Id. at 368. By 1956, “several midwestern schools including 
Indiana University announced that they would no longer schedule games in the South if 
their black players were barred.” Martin, supra note 6, at 71. 
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whenever intersectional games were not cancelled,87 and change 
became possible.88 
 
D. Southern Bowls Forced to Adapt in the Face of Northern  
Resistance 
 
The increasing resistance of northern teams to southern 
segregation demands forced bowl committees to reconsider their 
policies lest they risk losing the enhanced prestige and revenue 
that accompanied exciting intersectional bowl games.89 This post-
war development “forced southern bowl committees to reevaluate 
their commitment to racial purity on the gridiron, since it now 
threatened to interfere with their desire to offer the public the 
most exciting possible match up and to maximize their own 
revenues.”90  Indeed, “[c]onfronted with a new firmness by . . . 
[northern] colleges, southern bowls began to waver in their loyalty 
to Jim Crow, fearing that they might lose the appeal and profits of 
attractive intersectional match ups if they did not modify their 
policies.”91 As described below, many southern bowl games 
 87.  For example, the University of Georgia first began playing integrated northern 
teams in 1950. See Martin, supra note 59, at 184–85. 
 88.  While university officials may, therefore, have been influenced by self-interest, it 
also seems likely that northern attitudes in the general public changed in the aftermath of 
a world war fought by both black and white Americans against a racist foreign enemy. 
Given the participation by African American soldiers in a war defending U.S. freedoms, 
black Americans rightly demanded more freedom after returning home. Bell, supra note 
8, at 524–25. Additionally, more white Americans felt the hypocrisy of denying that 
freedom. E.g., Martin, supra note 66, at 362–63. Thus, increased athletic integration in 
northern universities after World War II may have been influenced by the principled 
desires for equality and racial progress, not exclusively by northern universities’ economic 
interests. That is, concerns for racial advancement converged with economic interests. 
 89.  See Martin, supra note 66, at 359–60. 
 90.  Id. at 362. 
 91.  Id. at 373. In addition to bowls, some individual universities were also forced to 
adapt to the new northern resistance. “[S]o anxious were Georgia administrators to 
maintain the prestige and profits of intersectional matches that, starting in 1950, they 
actually permitted the Bulldogs to schedule integrated opponents, the first SEC member 
from the Deep South to do so.” Martin, supra note 59, at 184–85; see also id. at 169 
(describing decisions by administrators of other SEC universities to play integrated 
opponents in intersectional games in the late 1950s because they feared “the absence of 
such popular contests would hurt their team’s national profile and their athletic 
department’s revenue”). The University of Alabama refused to play regular-season games 
against any team with a black player until the late 1960s. Id. at 183. But “[t]his absence 
from intersectional competition eventually endangered Alabama’s national rankings, 
forcing [Coach Bear] Bryant and school officials to reconsider their policies.” Id. 
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eventually modified their policies and permitted participation by 
African American players.92 The interests of black athletes were 
furthered, but only because they converged with the financial 
interests of the white organizers of these bowl games.93 
 
i. The Cotton Bowl 
 
The first of the three major southern bowl games to bend 
was the Cotton Bowl.94 At the end of the 1947 season, Penn State 
was undefeated, had won the Lambert Trophy, and was ranked 
fourth in the Associated Press poll,95 while Southern Methodist 
University (“SMU”)—a local Dallas favorite—was its conference 
champion, was ranked third in the country, and was likewise 
undefeated.96 Due to the box office appeal of a contest between a 
“home team” and the eastern champions, the Cotton Bowl 
committee invited Penn State to play even though it knew Penn 
State would insist on the participation of its two African American 
players.97 The result was record-setting demand for tickets with 
100,000 fans applying for tickets in the first four days.98 An 
overflow crowd generated record-breaking revenue and aided the 
Cotton Bowl committee in financing an expansion of its stadium.99 
The following year, Cotton Bowl officials invited another 
integrated team, the University of Oregon, with its three African 
American players, to play SMU—again resulting in an overflow 
crowd in the newly expanded stadium.100 
 
The gamble paid off handsomely, as the Cotton Bowl 
profited enormously from the two consecutive 
outstanding pairings. Although race relations in Dallas 
were conservative and paternalistic, bowl officials and 
 92.  See Martin, supra note 66, at 359–60. 
 93.  Cf. Bell, supra note 8 (describing interest convergence in the context of 
educational integration). 
 94.  Martin, supra note 66, at 362. 
 95.  At the time, the Lambert Trophy was awarded to the best eastern football team. 
Id. at 363. 
 96.  SMU had an 8-0-1 record that season. Id. 
 97.  See id. at 363–64. 
 98.  Id. at 364. 
 99.  Id. at 365. 
 100.  Id. 
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city fathers understood the financial and public 
relations benefits that their city could gain from 
flexibility in athletic scheduling. The Cotton Bowl’s 
willingness to breach the color line for one day each 
year also gave it a competitive advantage over the Sugar 
Bowl and Orange Bowl in recruiting top-ranked 
nonsouthern teams, since these two competitors 
retained their policies of racial exclusion.101 
 
As was so often the case, it was only the convergence of 
black interests with the economic interests of whites that 
permitted racial progress.102 That is, the Cotton Bowl committee 
was willing to invite the best teams, even if integrated, if its games 
could be the most popular and thereby generate the greatest 
revenue. Moreover, by hosting an integrated team, the committee 
in Texas gained a competitive advantage over the other southern 
bowls in Louisiana and Miami which remained staunchly 
segregated.103 In this manner, the economic interests of the 
Cotton Bowl committee converged with the civil rights of African 
Americans, allowing the African American interests to advance.104 
 
ii. The Sugar Bowl 
 
By the time the Sugar Bowl experimented with integration 
eight years later, the southern social landscape had regressed 
significantly in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 1954 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education, becoming explosively 
hostile to any form of integration.105 This change set the stage for 
bitter controversy when the Sugar Bowl committee invited the 
University of Pittsburgh, with one African American player, to 
participate in its January 1, 1956, contest.106 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Cf. Bell, supra note 8 (describing interest convergence in the context of 
educational integration). 
 103.  Martin, supra note 66, at 365. 
 104.  Cf. Bell, supra note 8 (describing interest convergence in the context of 
educational integration). 
 105.  E.g., DEMAS, supra note 6, at 80–81; Bell, supra note 8, at 525–26; Martin, supra 
note 66, at 370. 
 106.  See Martin, supra note 66, at 370. The Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education decision had “ignited an explosion of southern white resistance.” Id. In fact, 
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By late 1955, the Sugar Bowl had been experiencing 
difficulty finding and attracting top-ranked teams. By then, the 
Atlantic Coast Conference (“ACC”), the Big 7 (later the Big 8), 
and the Southwest Conference champions were all contractually 
obligated to participate in other January 1 bowl games.107 So to 
maximize the potential excitement and, therefore, the value of its 
game, Sugar Bowl officials did not limit their search to all-white 
teams, but instead considered teams’ records of athletic success 
apart from their racial composition. Given the standings of both 
the University of Pittsburgh and Georgia Tech University 
(“Georgia Tech”), the Sugar Bowl committee extended invitations 
for both to participate in the January 1, 1956, game.108 
The decision resulted in an enormous backlash.109  
Prompted by massive complaints from segregationists, Governor 
Marvin Griffin forbade Georgia Tech from participating, which, in 
turn, sparked overnight demonstrations by Georgia Tech students 
who wanted the game to go forward.110 University regents 
reluctantly approved the trip.111 “[T]he school’s desire to reap the 
benefits of national success in football—television dollars, 
recognition, and so on—clashed with the state[’s] . . . reaction to 
Brown and the specter of forced integration.”112 
Although the student demonstrations appear to have been 
prompted primarily by a desire to attend the football game, not to 
end all segregation,113 
 
the reaction of [Georgia] Tech’s administrators and 
student body [nonetheless] show[ed] how the greater 
rewards awaiting successful college football programs 
could generate a willingness to fight segregation [on 
the football field] in exchange for winning football 
teams . . . . [T]he importance of participating in a 
“‘[l]egislatures in the former Confederate states [had] enacted some 450 segregationist 
laws and resolutions’ during the ten years following the Brown ruling.” Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  See id. 
 109.  Id. at 370–71. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See id. at 371. 
 112.  DEMAS, supra note 6, at 24. 
 113.  See id. at 72–101; Martin, supra note 66, at 370–71 (showing student placard: “We 
want to go to the Sugar Bowl”). 
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prestigious bowl game seemed to trump, if only briefly, 
the clear code of segregation at Georgia Tech.114 
 
The Sugar Bowl’s decision to invite the University of 
Pittsburgh, despite the fact that it had an African American player, 
was prompted by its economic interest in fielding a competitive 
team. Similarly, Georgia Tech’s decision to attend the game, in 
spite of the governor’s demand, was likewise motivated by the lure 
of economic reward and prestige from participating. 
Consequently, the integration of the Sugar Bowl for this event 
occurred only because African American interests converged with 
the economic interests of powerful white institutions, not because 
of concern for racial equality.115 
Commercial interests, not principle, prompted the 
adaptations southern bowl committees made by allowing 
integrated teams to participate when faced with northern 
resistance to segregation.116  Money could be made by integrating 
bowl games, but in regional games between southern teams, no 
 114.  DEMAS, supra note 6, at 25. 
 115.  In the aftermath of this episode, Louisiana enacted a variety of strict segregation 
laws. Martin, supra note 66, at 372; Martin, supra note 6, at 74. For example, Louisiana 
prohibited interracial sporting contests altogether and re-segregated seating at all public 
events, Martin, supra note 66, at 372; Martin, supra note 6, at 74, despite a warning from 
Sugar Bowl officials that the laws would “seriously damage our sports program.” Martin, 
supra note 66, at 372. In fact, the new laws did harm the Sugar Bowl as northern teams 
again refused to play. Until federal courts invalidated these state laws, the Sugar Bowl 
football game and basketball tournament became “regional events exclusively between all-
white southern teams,” markedly reducing the Sugar Bowl’s national visibility as well as its 
value and influence as an organization. Id. In 1964, the last of these laws was invalidated, 
and in January 1965, the Sugar Bowl resumed its non-discrimination policy, inviting 
Syracuse—with eight African American players—to play against LSU. Id. It took several 
years, however, for the Sugar Bowl “to fully erase . . . [the] stigma” of its former 
segregationist policy “and reestablish strong television ratings.” Id. at 372–73. 
  Although reintegration at this time served both African American interests and 
allowed the Sugar Bowl to become more competitive and, therefore, eventually to 
improve its economic standing, it cannot be said that reintegration was undertaken out of 
a sense of social conscience. Had concern for racial equality been the driving force, the 
new integration should not have been limited to the playing field, but would have also 
extended to the Sugar Bowl organization. Nevertheless, that organization remained fully 
white. Id. at 373. As Professor Bell has observed, “[t]he interest of blacks in achieving 
racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of 
whites . . . [and will not be accommodated] where the remedy sought threatens the 
superior societal status of middle and upper class whites.” Bell, supra note 8, at 523. 
 116.  See DEMAS, supra note 6, at 48; cf. Davis, supra note 9, at 634–35 (describing 
commercial forces prompting integration of college football and basketball generally). 
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financial gain would be derived by integrating.117 Had the reform 
been undertaken for principle, integration in other southern 
games would have been expected as well. However, “most 
southern white universities did not rush to” invite integrated 
opponents for regular-season games, nor did they seek to integrate 
their own teams.118 This lack of broader change provides evidence 
that integration in some southern bowls was motivated by 
economic self-interest, not by enlightened goodwill. 
 
E. As Non-Southern Teams Transitioned to Widespread  
Integration in the Mid-1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, 
Pressure Increased on Southern Teams to Do So as Well 
 
College sports remained a highly segregated institution in 
the early post-war years until it became apparent to universities, 
conferences, and bowl organizations that racial integration was 
essential to compete successfully.119 Subsequently, college sports, 
which had already enjoyed some commercial success because of 
the popular intersectional contests and bowl games, began 
generating more significant revenue because of television.120 This 
increased commercialization—especially for football and men’s 
basketball—gave universities even greater incentive to win 
games.121 To improve the chances of athletic success, it became 
 117.  In the mid-1950s, integration in southern football was limited to southern bowl 
games. Martin, supra note 66, at 374. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  To maximize athletic success, those institutions’ leaders needed to integrate 
teams to draw from the broadest possible sources of talent. See Davis, supra note 9, at 634–
35; supra note 9 (denying that differences in physical ability are based upon innate racial 
differences). 
 120.  DEMAS, supra note 6, at 4 (“The advent of television spurred institutes of higher 
education to embrace intersectional contests and a national sporting ethos, most notably 
in the formation of major athletic conferences, televised ‘bowl games,’ and a national 
ranking system.”); id. at 32 (describing “the postwar advent of television”); id. at 48 
(describing how post-World War II “lucrative television contracts . . . forced segregated 
schools to consider accepting prestigious bowl bids without regard to the opponent” even 
those that included African American players); id. at 60 (characterizing as valuable the 
publicity afforded by nationwide television coverage); id. at 71 (describing the increase in 
the popularity and importance of football after World War II); Davis, supra note 9, at 634–
35. 
 121.  E.g., DEMAS, supra note 6, at 56−57 (describing the financial benefits of building 
successful football teams in the form of “gate receipts[,] . . . local economic stimulus, . . . 
recognition, extensive television and print coverage, and the greater potential to play in 
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vitally important for universities not only to agree to play 
integrated opponents, but also to abandon the practice of 
excluding athletes from their own teams on the arbitrary basis of 
race.122 
Not surprisingly, northern teams began integrating first in 
larger numbers.123 Once the northern teams integrated, the 
pressure was on southern teams to do so as well.124 Then, and only 
then—when the economic consequences of winning games 
became paramount—did many colleges integrate their own 
teams.125 The 1966 NCAA basketball championship contest was a 
all-important bowl games”); id. at 140 (describing the “large economic payoffs” of “a 
school’s athletic achievement”). 
 122.  Id. at 64; Davis, supra note 9, at 634–35; Martin, supra note 6, at 78–79. The first 
college football team with more than one or two African American players was UCLA 
from 1938 to 1941. DEMAS, supra note 6, at 22 (noting that the squad had five African 
American players). “UCLA’s on-field success garnered high national rankings and 
publicity.” Id. By allowing African American athletes to participate, UCLA was able to 
“compete . . . on a national level” and thereby to gain national prominence. Id. at 22, 30 
(illustrating the economic advantages of integration). 
 123.  DEMAS, supra note 6, at 2−3 (describing integration in northern colleges during 
periods of continued segregation in the South); id. at 7−10 (describing slow integration 
among northern teams before World War II but no participation by black football players 
on southern teams for decades after World War II); Spivey, supra note 78, at 122 
(“Intercollegiate sports was cashing in on black athletes. The post-war era was the coming 
of age of big time intercollegiate sports and the final victory in collegiate athletics of the 
win-at-any-cost mentality.”). 
 124.  DEMAS, supra note 6, at 3 (describing integration of SEC universities’ own 
athletic teams as beginning after 1966); Martin, supra note 59, at 172 (quoting a 
newspaper editorial advocating integration of University of Kentucky athletic teams: 
“Think of what a rich recruiting field the South would offer if its own schools started 
seeking out good Negro athletes, instead of losing them by default to the rest of the 
country!”); id. at 173 (describing both the competitive advantage Kentucky could gain 
over its SEC rivals by being the first to integrate and the view of administrators that 
athletic success could “upgrade the university’s national image”); Martin, supra note 6, at 
73. 
 125.  DEMAS, supra note 6, at 108 (describing the rich financial rewards schools 
obtained by the late 1960s from successful football programs and how “[b]lack student 
athletes—hitherto considered direct threats to social stability at southern universities—
were now crucial to the imagined communities these very schools desired”); ELDER, supra 
note 53, at 84 (“I knew recruiting black players would give me a chance to have a better 
basketball team . . . . I knew that adding black athletes would help us be more 
competitive.”); Forrest J. Berghorn et al., Racial Participation and Integration in Men’s and 
Women’s Intercollegiate Basketball: Continuity and Change, 1958–1985, 5 SOC. SPORT J. 107, 109 
(1988) (describing the large increase in the percentage of black men’s basketball players 
in NCAA universities from 1948 through 1980); Martin, supra note 59, at 181 (describing 
Auburn University’s first admission of an African American basketball player in 1968 and 
the school’s defense that it was a “means of strengthening the various Tiger teams”); id. at 
182 (describing the failure of the all-white football team at Mississippi State University to 
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dramatic watershed in the long path toward racial integration in 
college sports. The game pitted southern powerhouse and 
number-one-ranked University of Kentucky against tiny Texas 
Western College.126 The Kentucky team was all white, while Texas 
Western fielded seven African Americans, all of whom were 
starters or top reserve players.127 “For the first time ever in an 
NCAA final, five black starters played against five white starters.”128 
Texas Western’s victory shocked the college basketball world and 
changed the racial landscape of southern basketball forever.129 
The game demonstrated graphically that southern teams would 
have to integrate to remain competitive. 
A similar watershed event took place for football in 1970 
when the University of Alabama played the University of Southern 
California, led by several African American players, in 
Birmingham, Alabama.130 This game represented Alabama’s first 
major intersectional home game in nearly twenty years131 and 
resulted in its humiliating defeat.132 While African Americans had 
theretofore attended Big Ten and Pacific-10 (“Pac-10”) schools, 
this game finally prompted the most staunchly segregated 
win even one game against an SEC rival from 1966 through 1969 once other SEC teams 
had begun to integrate and the coach’s subsequent recruitment of two African 
Americans); id. at 184 (asserting that LSU’s football success resulted from its decision in 
1971 to begin recruiting black athletes); id. at 188−89 (describing the signing of the first 
African American football player at the University of Mississippi (“Ole Miss”) in May 1969 
at a time when several other SEC schools were considering black prospects); id. at 189−90 
(describing the University of Mississippi’s embarrassing loss to a formerly weak but 
recently integrated University of Southern Mississippi, prompting calls for Ole Miss to 
integrate); Martin, supra note 6, at 78−79 (noting that Texas Western College began the 
integration of southern college basketball in 1956 but that the two new African American 
players were required to live off campus because of continued dormitory segregation, 
illustrating that college officials were more interested in improving their athletic record 
than in advancing civil rights); id. at 80−84 (describing period of integration of basketball 
at southern universities and asserting it was undertaken to win games, not to further racial 
equality). 
 126.  Martin, supra note 6, at 80. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id.; see also ELDER, supra note 53, at 12−13. The Texas Western “team was (and 
still is) credited with hastening the desegregation of college basketball in the South.” 
DEMAS, supra note 6, at 112. 
 130.  See ELDER, supra note 53, at 12; Martin, supra note 59, at 183. 
 131.  Martin, supra note 59, at 183. 
 132.  Id. 
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southern schools to open their doors to opportunities for African 
Americans.133 
While many whites were unquestionably motivated by a 
desire for fairness and equality in the long evolution toward 
integration in college athletics,134 the evidence strongly suggests 
that desegregation of these sports teams would not have occurred 
had it not also served the economic interests of the white college 
sports establishment.135 In every major shift along that evolution, 
change was motivated by the leaders’ economic interests while 
altruism was not always present.136 Moreover, accommodating 
racial integration in college sports not only allowed universities to 
compete athletically and therefore to benefit commercially, it also 
carried no threat to the superior societal status of middle- and 
upper-class whites137 because under amateurism, the athletes 




The racial integration of NCAA football and men’s 
basketball fits squarely within Professor Bell’s thesis—that African 
Americans’ interest in achieving racial equality advanced only 
 133.  ELDER, supra note 53, at 12; Martin, supra note 59, at 183. 
 134.  See, e.g., ELDER, supra note 53, at 15; cf. Bell, supra note 8, at 525 (asserting in the 
context of educational integration that some whites were motivated by morality). 
 135.  Cf. Bell, supra note 8 (describing interest convergence in the context of 
educational integration). 
 136.  See id.; Davis, supra note 9, at 635. 
 137.  See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 53, at 34 (noting that for African Americans to gain 
a representative role among sports managers, whites would have to give up power and that 
this has not occurred); Timothy Davis, Who’s In and Who’s Out: Racial Discrimination in 
Sports, 28 PAC. L.J. 341, 351 (1997) (reviewing KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND 
WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA (1996)) (stating that “racial equity in sports will be 
impeded by beliefs that African-Americans’ gains translate into a corresponding loss of 
power by whites”); Martin, supra note 66, at 373 (describing white reluctance to include 
African Americans as associate members of the Sugar Bowl organization, a role that had 
formerly been reserved for whites); see also Bell, supra note 8, at 523 (noting generally that 
African Americans’ interests will not be accommodated “where the remedy sought 
threatens the superior societal status of middle and upper class whites”). 
 138.  See DIV. I MANUAL, supra note 3, arts. 12.1.2, 12.4.1.1, 15.02.2, and 15.1; 
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 1, at 14; McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra 
note 10, at 74 (noting that universities fail to pay athletes a competitive wage and thereby 
profit fantastically from their labor). 
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when it converged with European Americans’ interests, but not 
when it conflicted with their superior societal standing.139 
Although the racial integration of athletic teams in 
American universities has created opportunities for African 
American athletes to attend college, this privilege also requires 
them to experience the exploitation that accompanies the status 
of being an amateur “student-athlete.”140 Thus, while African 
American athletes may now participate in NCAA athletics, under 
the current NCAA amateurism regime, these young men are 
simultaneously exploited in that their work generates vast wealth 
that is reserved for the benefit of almost exclusively European 
American managers of college sports.141 At the same time, the 
educations they receive are frequently of dubious value142 and too 
often do not result in the conference of a degree.143 Now, instead 
of outright exclusion from college sports, young black athletes are 
exploited for the entertainment and profit of whites. This 
phenomenon, too, neatly fits Professor Bell’s observation that 
“[w]hat appears to be progress toward racial justice is, in fact, a 
cyclical process. Barriers are lowered in one era only to reveal a 
new set of often more sophisticated but no less effective policies 
that maintain Blacks in a subordinate status.”144 
 139.  See generally Bell, supra note 8. 
 140.  Brooks & Althouse, supra note 53, at 304, 307 (describing the relationship 
between African American athletes and universities as one characterized by 
“exploitation”); Davis, supra note 9, at 678 (positing that the unconscious racism fostered 
by racist athletic stereotypes results in the “devaluation of the African-American student-
athlete’s academic interest,” thereby raising the issue of the “exploitation of black student-
athletes who provide valuable services, yet too often leave their institutions . . . without 
having obtained the academic preparation necessary . . . to cope successfully”); Edwards, 
supra note 9, at 9–10 (describing specific instances of African American athlete 
exploitation); McCormick & McCormick, Emperor’s, supra note 10, at 506–07; McCormick 
& McCormick, supra note 1, at 16; McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 10, at 74; 
cf. DEMAS, supra note 6, at 132–33 (describing the movement in the late 1960s in which 
African American athletes protested their treatment on the University of Wyoming 
football team as being “worse than [Jackie] Robinson’s . . . experience at UCLA” in the 
late 1930s). 
 141.  Cf. Davis, supra note 9, at 678 (characterizing as exploitative the regime in which 
African American athletes provide valuable services without receiving an adequate 
education). 
 142.  E.g., McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 10, at 135–55. 
 143.  See id; supra note 55 (regarding graduation rates). 
 144.  DERRICK A. BELL JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 8 (3d ed. 1993). 
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Although barriers were lowered in the 1940s through the 
1970s through the desegregation of college sports teams,145 other 
policies remain—specifically NCAA amateurism rules—which have 
the effect of perpetuating economic and social exploitation and 
subordination of young African American men.146 Much remains 
to be done to reform college sports. A good place to start would 
be to integrate further the ranks of university administrators, 
coaches, athletic directors, and conference and NCAA officials.147 
To accomplish full reform, however, athletes should have real 
opportunities to benefit from their college educations, and 
significantly, hypocritical NCAA amateurism rules should be 
repealed.148 African American athletes should not be relegated to 




 145.  Davis, supra note 9, at 633–37. 
 146.  McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 10, at 74. 
 147.  See, e.g., SHROPSHIRE, supra note 53, at 121–27 (advocating for increased African 
American representation in the “power positions” of athletic management); Brooks & 
Althouse, supra note 53, at 304; Clark, supra note 57, at 351; Elmore, supra note 53, at 291–
92; Floyd Keith, Minorities are Separate and Unequal: A Look at Minority Hiring Practices in 
Collegiate and Professional Athletics, in REVERSING FIELD, supra note 53, at 354; Cyrus Merhi, 
The Critical Role of the Fritz Pollard Alliance, in REVERSING FIELD, supra note 53, at 365; 
Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Changing Landscape of African Americans in Sports, in REVERSING 
FIELD, supra note 53, at 359, 361; Lapchick, supra note 45. 
 148.  Establishing educational primacy would entail numerous reforms, including, for 
example: allowing athletes more time to study; giving them more freedom in selecting 
majors; scheduling fewer games; requiring less travel; assuring better pre-college academic 
preparation; giving more attention to academic ability in recruiting; and allowing athletes 
to return to college with a scholarship to graduate in case a professional career fails. See 
generally McCormick & McCormick, Myth, supra note 10 (describing multiple barriers to 
athlete education and advocating free-market compensation for Division I college football 
and men’s basketball players). 
